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Abstract
In (single-server) Private Information Retrieval (PIR), a server holds a large database DB
of size n, and a client holds an index i ∈ [n] and wishes to retrieve DB[i] without revealing
i to the server. It is well known that information theoretic privacy even against an “honest
but curious” server requires Ω(n) communication complexity. This is true even if quantum
communication is allowed and is due to the ability of such an adversarial server to execute the
protocol on a superposition of databases instead of on a specific database (“input purification
attack”). Nevertheless, there have been some proposals of protocols that achieve sub-linear
communication and appear to provide some notion of privacy. Most notably, a protocol due to
Le Gall (ToC 2012) with communication complexity O(
√
n), and a protocol by Kerenidis et al.
(QIC 2016) with communication complexity O(log(n)), and O(n) shared entanglement.
We show that, in a sense, input purification is the only potent adversarial strategy, and
protocols such as the two protocols above are secure in a restricted variant of the quantum
honest but curious (a.k.a specious) model. More explicitly, we propose a restricted privacy
notion called anchored privacy, where the adversary is forced to execute on a classical database
(i.e. the execution is anchored to a classical database). We show that for measurement-free
protocols, anchored security against honest adversarial servers implies anchored privacy even
against specious adversaries.
Finally, we prove that even with (unlimited) pre-shared entanglement it is impossible to
achieve security in the standard specious model with sub-linear communication, thus further
substantiating the necessity of our relaxation. This lower bound may be of independent interest
(in particular recalling that PIR is a special case of Fully Homomorphic Encryption).
1 Introduction
Private Information Retrieval (PIR), introduced by Chor et al. [CGKS95], is perhaps the most
basic form of joint computation with privacy guarantee. PIR is concerned with privately retrieving
an entry from a database, without revealing which entry has been accessed. Formally, a PIR
protocol is a communication protocol between two parties, a server holding a large database DB
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containing n binary entries1, and a client who wishes to retrieve the ith element of the database but
without revealing the index i. Privacy can be defined using standard cryptographic notions such as
indistinguishability or simulation (see [Gol04]). The simplicity of this primitive is since there is no
privacy requirement for the database (i.e. we allow sending more information than necessary) and
that the server is not required to produce any output in the end of the interaction, so functionality
and privacy are one sided.
Clearly PIR is achievable by sending all of DB to the client. This will have communication
complexity n and will be perfectly private under any plausible definition since the client sends
no information. The absolute optimal result one could hope for is a protocol with logarithmic
communication, matching the most communication efficient protocol without privacy constraints,
in which the client sends the index i to the server and receives DB[i] in response.
Alas, [CGKS95] proved that linear (in n) communication complexity is necessary for PIR, and
that this is the case even in the presence of arbitrary setup information.2 Despite its pessimistic
outlook, this lower-bound served (already in [CGKS95] itself) as starting point to two extremely
prolific and influential lines of research, showing that the communication complexity can be vastly
improved if we place some restrictions on the server. The first considered multiple non-interacting
servers (see, e.g., [Efr12, DG15] and references therein), instead of just a single server, and the
second considered computationally bounded servers and relying on cryptographic assumptions (see,
e.g., [CMS99,Gen09,BV11]).
While our discussion so far referred to protocols executed by classical parties over classical
communication channels, the focus of this work is on the quantum setting, where there is a quantum
communication channel between the client and server, and where the parties themselves are capable
of performing quantum operations. Importantly, we still only require functionality for a classical
database and a classical index.
One could hope that introducing quantum channels could allow an information theoretic so-
lution to a problem that classically can only be solved using cryptographic assumptions, as has
been the case for quantum key distribution [BB84], quantum money [Wie83], quantum digital sig-
natures [GC01], quantum coin-flipping [Moc07, CK09, ACG+16] and more [BS16]. Indeed, the
notion of Quantum PIR (or QPIR) is quite a natural extension of its classical counterpart and
has also been extensively studied in the literature. Nayak’s famous result on the impossibility of
random access codes [Nay99] implies a linear lower bound for non-interactive protocols (ones that
consists of only a single message from the server to the client), and implicitly, via extension of the
same methods, also for multi-round protocols. Formal variants of this lower bound were proven
also by Jain, Radhakrishnan and Sen [JRS09] (in terms of quantum mutual information) and by
Baumeler and Broadbent [BB15]. Indeed, one could trace back all of these results to the notion of
adversary purification which was used to show the impossibility of various cryptographic tasks in
the information-theoretic quantum model starting as early as [Lo97,LC97,May97]. In the context
of QPIR, it can be shown that executing a QPIR protocol with sub-linear communication on a
superposition of databases instead of on a single database, will leave the server at the end of the
execution with a state that reveals some information about the index i. This is made explicit
in [JRS09, Section 3.1] and is also implicit in the proof of [BB15].
1Throughout this work we will focus on the setting of binary database. We do note that there is vast literature
concerned with optimizations for the case of larger alphabet.
2Setup refers to any information that is provided to the parties prior to the execution of the protocol by a trusted
entity, but crucially one that does not depend on the parties’ inputs. Shared randomness or shared entanglement are
common examples.
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Most relevant to our work is the aforementioned [BB15], which provides an analysis from a
cryptographic perspective and considers a well defined adversarial model known as privacy against
specious adversaries, or the specious model for short. This adversarial model was introduced by
Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail [DNS10] as a quantum counterpart to the classical notion of honest
but curious (a.k.a semi-honest) adversaries.3 A specious adversary can be thought of as one that
contains, as a part of its local state, a sub-state which is indistinguishable from that of the respective
honest party, even when inspected jointly with the other party’s local state.4
Let us provide a high level description of the specious model. We provide a general outline for
two-party protocols, and not one that is specific to QPIR. Consider a protocol executed between
parties A,B on input registers X,Y respectively. Let A,B also denote the local state of the parties
at a given point in time. Then the state of an honest execution of the protocol on inputs XY can
be described by the joint density matrix of the registers XABY . A specious adversarial strategy
for party A can be thought of as one where at any point in time, the local state of the adversary
is of the form A′XA (i.e. the adversary is allowed to maintain additional information, possibly in
superposition with other parts of the system), such that the reduced density matrix of XABY
is still indistinguishable from the one obtained in an honest execution. This provides a potential
advantage to a specious adversary (compared to an honest A) since it is quite possible that together
with A′, the joint state is no longer honest. Thus the local view of the adversary, i.e. the registers
A′XA, might in fact reveal information about B’s input Y that was supposed to have been kept
private.
In the QPIR setting, say taking A to be the server and B to be the client, the register X
holds the database DB, and Y holds the index i. Indeed, [BB15] shows that it is sufficient that A′
contains a purification of XA, where X is a uniform distribution over all databases. We call this
the purification attack. Thus, while the adversary pretends to execute the protocol on a randomly
sampled database, it is in fact executed on a superposition of all possible databases at the same
time (indeed this is the case since A′ contains a purification of X). As explained above, this
methodology is not new, but [BB15] analyze and show that no meaningful notion of QPIR can be
achieved against this class of adversaries.
While the negative results could leave us pessimistic as to the abilities of quantum techniques to
improve the state of the art on single-server PIR, there is some optimism suggested by two works.
Le Gall [LG12] proposed a protocol with sub-linear communication (specifically O(
√
n)). Kerenidis
et al. [KLGR16] proposed two protocols – an explicit one, with O(log n) communication, which
requires linear pre-shared entanglement; and a second protocol, with poly-logarithmic communi-
cation (and does not require pre-shared entanglement). In terms of privacy, it is shown that in a
perfectly honest execution of the protocol, client’s privacy is preserved. It might not be immediately
clear how to translate this proof of privacy to the existing security models and reconcile it with
the negative results. It is explained in [LG12] that the protocol is not actually secure if the server
deviates from the protocol. However, as [BB15] observed, even a specious attacker that purifies
the adversary can violate the security of the protocol, and the privacy proof strongly hinges on the
honest execution using a classical database.
3As [DNS10] point out, their model is stronger, i.e. excludes a larger class of attacks, compared to the honest but
curious model, even when restricted to a completely classical setting.
4More accurately, indistinguishability is required to hold even in the presence of an environment which can be
arbitrary correlated (or entangled) with the parties’ inputs. In the quantum setting this usually corresponds to the
environment.
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Challenges. The state of affairs prior to this work, was that (non-trivial) QPIR was proven
impossible even against fairly weak adversaries (namely, specious). Nevertheless, it appears that
[LG12,KLGR16] achieve some non-trivial privacy guarantee using sub-linear communication. This
privacy guarantee appears not to be captured by the existing security model. Lastly, we notice that
all existing negative results are proven in a standalone model and did not consider protocols where
the parties are allowed to share (honestly generated) setup information, such as the one by Kerenidis
et al. [KLGR16]. In the quantum setting, a natural question is whether shared entanglement can
help in achieving a stronger result.5 The goal of this work is to address these challenges.
1.1 Our Results
Anchored Privacy. We start by formalizing a refinement of the standard notion of quantum
privacy - one where the adversary is not allowed to purify its input register. We show anchored
privacy against specious adversaries follows from anchored privacy against an honest party, if
the protocol itself does not require parties to perform measurements (i.e. is measurement-free).
Formally, using our notation from above, privacy in our model is only required to hold if the
reduced density matrix of the register X is a standard basis element, i.e. a fixed classical value. We
call our model anchored privacy as we can view our adversary as anchored to a specific value for
its input X.
We observe that Le Gall’s O(
√
n) protocol [LG12] and the two protocols mentioned above by
Kerenidis et al. [KLGR16] are in fact private against honest servers. We prove that explicitly for the
pre-shared entanglement protocol by Kerinidis et al. in Appendix B. Using our reduction we can
deduce that these protocol are also anchored private against specious adversaries, namely that so
long as the adversary does not attempt to execute the protocol on a superposition of databases (and
is still specious in the manner explained above), privacy is guaranteed. In a sense, we formalize the
folklore reliance on input purification to attack cryptographic schemes (and QPIR in particular),
and show that in a model where input purification is impossible or prevented via some external
restriction, it is possible to achieve security against specious adversaries.
We believe this model is interesting for three main reasons:
1. Conceptually, this model helps clarify the exact reason for the impossibility of QPIR - it is
precisely because of the purification attack. Indeed, there is a formal sense in which some
anchoring is necessary since we know that for any proposed protocol, allowing to execute on a
superposition of inputs allows to violate security – see the preceeding discussion in Section 1.
2. We view the anchored specious model as a stepping stone towards more robust notions. One
intriguing future direction (mentioned briefly in our list of open problems) is to try to develop
a malicious analog that still implements the ideology of “forbidden input purification, e.g. by
forcing the adversary to “classically open the database before or after the execution in a
manner that is consistent with the clients output. Another interesting direction is to try
to enforce anchoring using a two-server setting, thus achieving logarithmic two-server QPIR
(which is currently still beyond reach).
5We note that to the best of our understanding, even prior “entropic” results such as [JRS09] seem to fall short of
capturing the potential additional power of shared entanglement. This is essentially due to the property that if AB
are entangled, then it is possible that the reduced state of B will have (much) higher von Neumann entropy than the
joint AB (whose entropy might even be 0).
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3. We believe that our new model may be plausible in certain situations where one could certify
that the server cannot employ a superposition on databases. We note that this model can
be externally enforced, e.g. by conducting an inspection of the server’s local computation
device (with a very low probability) and making sure that it complies, and otherwise apply
a heavy penalty. One could imagine such an inspection verifying that a copy of the database
is stored on a macroscopic device that cannot be placed in superposition using available
technology. Another example of a setting where the anchored model could be applicable is
when the database contains information with some semantic meaning, so that the client can
easily notice when a nonsense value has been used (this is somewhat similar to the setting
considered in [GLM08]). We recall that semi-honest protocols are often used as building
blocks, with additional external mechanisms that are employed to validate the assumptions
of the model, and hope that our model can also be used in this way. Lastly, from a purely
scientific perspective, we believe that formalizing and pinpointing a non-trivial model where
non-trivial QPIR is possible will allow to better understand this primitive and the relation
between quantum privacy and its classical counterpart.
Improved Lower Bound. It would be instrumental to understand why the known QPIR lower
bounds do not apply to our logarithmic protocol described above. Specifically, the protocol makes
use of setup (pre-shared entanglement), and one could wonder whether this is the source of im-
provement, and perhaps with pre-shared entanglement it is possible to prove security even in the
standard specious model. We show that this is not the case by providing a lower bound in the
specious model even for the one-sided communication from the server to the client. Namely, we
show that linear communication from the server to the client is necessary even if we allow arbitrary
communication from the client to the server. In particular, this rules out the ability to use the
setup to circumvent the lower bound, since the client (which is assumed to be honest) can generate
the setup locally, and send the server’s share across the channel at the beginning of the protocol.
This completes the picture in terms of the impossibility of QPIR in the specious model and further
justifies our relaxation of the model in order to achieve meaningful results.
Noting that PIR can be thought of as a special case of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE),
our lower bound implies that even a Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption (QFHE) with (even
approximate) information theoretic security cannot have non-trivial communication complexity,
even if the QFHE protocol is allowed to make use of shared entanglement between the server and
the client. We thus generalize (to allow shared prior entanglement) the impossibility results for
(even imperfect) QPIR of [BB15] (as well as those of [YPF14] which explicitly referred to QFHE).
1.2 Overview of Our Techniques
Anchored-Specious Security. Recall the notation introduced above for two party protocol
(A,B) on inputs (X,Y ), and recall that a specious adversary can be thought of as one where the
local state of the adversary is of the form A′XA. Now let us consider the case of measurement-free
protocols and also assume that the client’s input Y is a pure state (this can be justified since
otherwise we can apply our argument on the joint state of Y and its purifying environment instead
of Y itself). In such an execution, it holds that at any stage XABY is a pure superposition (i.e.
its density matrix is of rank 1). Now let us consider the joint state together with the specious
adversary’s additional register, i.e. A′XABY . Since (XABY ) is pure, A′ cannot be entangled
with it, and therefore A′ is in tensor product with the remainder of the state, namely (XABY ).
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It follows that the status of the register A′ can be simulated at any point in time without any
knowledge of the other components of the protocol. There is a delicate point here, since A′ may
indeed be in tensor product, but we must also argue that it is independent of Y . Intuitively, to see
why such dependence on Y cannot occur consider, e.g., Y = |y1〉 + |y2〉. Then Y A′ is in the sate
|y1〉⊗ ρA′ + |y2〉⊗ ρA′ (importantly the same ρA′ appears twice). However, this state is exactly the
purification of executing the protocol either with Y = |y1〉 or with Y = |y2〉. We conclude that ρA′
must be the same in both settings, and by extension it can be shown to be the same for all Y .
After taking care of A′, we need to consider the other part of the adversary’s state, namely the
register (XA). This register is, by definition, identical (or indistinguishable) from the state of an
honest party during the execution. Recall that we assume our protocol is anchored private against
honest servers. So the local honest state (XA) is guaranteed not to leak information about B’s
input. Add to that the conclusion about A′ being in tensor product and independent of B’s state,
and we get that the entire local state of the specious adversary does not reveal any disallowed
information.
As a conclusion, since we can show, e.g. in Le Gall’s protocol or in our logarithmic protocol,
that an honest execution with a classical X does not leak information about Y , this will also be
the case in the anchored-specious setting.
Obviously many details are omitted from this high level overview. For example, a specious
adversary is not required to make (XABY ) identical to an honest execution but rather only statis-
tically close (in trace distance), which requires a more delicate analysis. Furthermore, the formal
construction of a simulator for the adversary as required by the specious definition requires some
care to detail. For the formal definitions and analysis see Section 3 below.
Our Lower Bound. We first note that previous lower bound proofs in [Nay99, BB15] bounded
the total communication complexity by a reduction to quantum random access codes. It is not
a-priori clear how to generalize this proof method to the presence of shared entanglement. To do
so, we provide a new lower bound argument that establishes a linear lower bound on the server’s
communication complexity. Specifically, we show that the server needs to transmit at least roughly
n/2 qubits to the client, no matter how many qubits is transmitted from the client to the server
(assuming that the protocol has sufficiently small correctness and privacy error). As we mentioned
above, such a lower bound trivially extends to hold with prior shared entanglement, since one can
think of that the shared entanglement is established by the client sending messages to the server.
Our new lower bound argument is based on an interactive leakage chain rule in [LC18] and
might even be considered conceptually simpler than previous methods. At a high level, we consider
a server holding a uniformly random database a ∈ {0, 1}n and running a QPIR protocol with a
client. Initially, from the client’s point of view, the database a has n-bits of min-entropy, and the
protocol execution can be viewed as an “interactive leakage” that leaks information about a to the
client. Let mA and mB denote the server and the client’s communication complexity in the protocol.
The interactive leakage chain rule in [LC18] states that the min-entropy of a can only be decreased
by at most min{2mA,mA+mB}. More precisely, let ρAB denote the states at the end of the protocol
execution where the A register stores the (classical) random database a and B denotes the client’s
local register. The interactive leakage chain rule states that Hmin(A|B)ρ ≥ n−min{2mA,mA+mB}.
By the operational meaning of quantum min-entropy, given the client’s state ρB, one cannot predict
the database correctly with probability higher than 2−(n−min{2mA,mA+mB}). On the other hand,
suppose the protocol is secure against specious servers with sufficiently small correctness and privacy
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error. We can combine the by-now standard lower bound argument by Lo [Lo97] and gentle
measurement [Win99, Aar04, ON07], we show that one can reconstruct the database a from the
client’s state ρB with a constant probability. Combining both claims allows us to establish lower
bounds on both the server’s and the total communication complexity in a unified way.
1.3 Remaining Open Problems
We proposed a new model and a new protocol which, we believe, resurfaces the question of what
can be achieved in the context of QPIR. We believe that a number of intriguing questions still
remain for future work.
1. As discussed above, our model is a relaxation of the specious model, which is by itself a
semi-honest model. Such models are fairly restrictive in the sense that they make structural
assumptions on the adversary (i.e. that it follows the protocol, or contains a part that follows
the protocol). Obviously, if we hope for non-trivial results, any model that we formalize
must preclude purification of input. It is thus an intriguing question whether it is possible to
formulate malicious adversarial models that are still purification-free, and what can be said
about the plausibility of QPIR in such models. The current definition of anchored privacy
will need to be amended, since a malicious server is allowed to just ignore its prescribed input,
so a different method of anchoring needs to be devised.
2. Another natural question is whether setup is necessary to achieve logarithmic QPIR in the
anchored specious model. We know from Kerenidis et al.’s result that polylogarithmic commu-
nication is achievable even without setup. Is there a reason can only improve it when assuming
a setup? Another surprising aspect is that the shared entanglement created during the setup
is not consumed during the protocol, and can be used for other needs after the execution of the
protocol (e.g., running another execution of PIR, or teleportation). A similar phenomenon
occurs in quantum information: catalyst quantum states are useful for mapping one bi-partite
state to another using LOCC, without consuming the catalyst state [JP99,Kli07]. The related
notion of quantum embezzlement [vDH03] has a similar property, but in this case, the original
shared state changes slightly. The authors are not aware of any other cryptographic protocol
with this non-consumption property.
3. Most state of the art classical PIR protocols (both in the multi-server setting and in the
computational cryptographic setting) only require one round of communication. That is, one
message (query) from the client to the server (or servers) and one response message. All the
existing sublinear QPIR protocols have multiple rounds. Understanding the round complexity
of QPIR in light of the classical state of the art is also an intriguing direction.
4. A main contribution of this work is to formalize the notion of anchored security and show it
can be used to provide a non-trivial cryptographic primitive. It would be interesting to study
the relevance of this notion (or adequately adapted versions) in the context of a variety of
other cryptographic tasks. In particular, the question of whether it is possible to construct in-
formation theoretically secure fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) given quantum channels
has received attention in recent years (see, e.g., [YPF14]). In homomorphic encryption, the
server has a function f and the client has an input x, and the goal of the protocol is for the
client to learn f(x) without revealing any information about x. PIR and FHE functionalities
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are intimately related (think about a function fDB(i) = DB[i] for FHE, and about executing
PIR with database equal to the truth table of some function), and it is thus intriguing whether
the anchored model is applicable in the context of FHE as well.
1.4 Paper Organization
General preliminaries are provided in Section 2. We present our new model, and the proof that
for pure protocols honest security implies anchored specious security in Section 3. Our new lower
bound is stated and proven in Section 4. In Appendix B, we show that the protocol by Kerenidis
et al. is anchored private against specious adversaries.
2 Preliminaries
Standard preliminaries regarding Hilbert spaces and quantum states can be found in Appendix A.
We provide below background and definitions concerning two-party quantum protocols, specious
adversaries and quantum private information retrieval.
2.1 Two-Party Quantum Protocols
As in [BB15], we base our definitions on the works of [GW07] and [DNS10]. However, we make
slight adaptations to allow for prior entanglement between the parties.
Definition 2.1 (Two-party quantum protocol). An s-round, two-party quantum protocol, denoted
Π = {A ,B, ρjoint, s} consists of:
1. input spaces A0 and B0 for parties A and B respectively,
2. initial spaces Ap and Bp (p for pre-shared state) for parties A and B respectively,
3. a joint initial state ρjoint ∈ Ap ⊗ Bp, split between the two parties,
4. memory spaces A1, . . . ,As for A and B1, . . . ,Bs forB, and communication spaces X1, . . . ,Xs,
Y1, . . . ,Ys−1,
5. an s-tuple of quantum operations (A1, . . . ,As) for A , where A1 : L(A0⊗Ap) 7→ L(A1⊗X1),
and At : L(At−1 ⊗ Yt−1) 7→ L(At ⊗Xt) (2 ≤ t ≤ s),
6. an s-tuple of quantum operations (B1, . . . ,Bs) for B, where B1 : L(B0 ⊗ Bp ⊗ X1) 7→
L(B1⊗Y1), Bt : L(Bt−1⊗Xt) 7→ L(Bt⊗Yt) (2 ≤ t ≤ s− 1), and Bs : L(Bs−1⊗Xs) 7→ L(Bs).
Note that in order to execute a protocol as defined above, one has to specify the input, namely
a quantum state ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0) from which the execution starts.
Definition 2.2 (Protocol Execution). If Π = {A ,B, ρjoint, s} is an s-round two-party protocol,
then the state after the t-th step (1 ≤ t ≤ 2s), and upon input state ρin ∈ S(A0⊗B0⊗R), for any
R, is defined as
ρt(ρin) := (A(t+1)/2 ⊗ IB(t−1)/2) . . . (B1 ⊗ IA1)(A1 ⊗ IB0,Bp)(ρin ⊗ ρjoint),
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for t odd, and
ρt(ρin) := (Bt/2 ⊗ IAt/2) . . . (B1 ⊗ IA1)(A1 ⊗ IB0,Bp)(ρin ⊗ ρjoint),
for t even. We define the final state of protocol Π = {A ,B, ρjoint, s} upon input state ρin ∈
S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R) as: [A ~B] (ρin) := ρ2s(ρin).
The communication complexity of a protocol is the number of qubits that are exchanged between
the parties. Slightly more generally, we can consider the logarithm of the dimension of the message
registers Xt, Yt. The formal definition thus follows.
Definition 2.3 (Communication Complexity). The communication complexity of a protocol as in
Definition 2.1 is
s∑
t=1
log dim(Xt) +
s−1∑
t=1
log dim(Yt) .
We sometimes also refer to one-sided communication complexity, i.e. the total communication orig-
inating from one party to the other. The communication complexity of A is defined to be the
communication originating from A , or formally
∑s
t=1 log dim(Xt). Symmetrically the communica-
tion complexity of B is
∑s−1
t=1 log dim(Yt).
2.2 Specious Adversary
Given a two-party quantum protocol Π = {A ,B, ρjoint, s}, an adversary A˜ for A is an s-tuple of
quantum operations (A1, . . . ,As), where A˜1 : L(A˜0) 7→ L(A1 ⊗ X1) and A˜t : L(A˜t−1 ⊗ Yt−1) 7→
L(A˜t ⊗ Xt), 2 ≤ t ≤ s, with A˜1, . . . , A˜s being A˜ ’s memory spaces. The global state after the tth
step of a protocol run with A˜ is ρ˜t(A˜ , ρin). An adversary B˜ for B is similarly defined.
Definition 2.4 (Specious adversaries). Let Π = {A ,B, ρjoint, s} be an s-round two-party protocol.
An adversary A˜ for A is said to be γ-specious, if there exists a sequence of quantum operations
(called recovery operators) F1, . . . ,F2s, such that for 1 ≤ t ≤ 2s and for all ρin ∈ S(A0⊗B0⊗R):
1. For all t even, Ft : L(A˜t/2) 7→ L(At/2).
2. For all t odd, Ft : L(A˜(t+1)/2 ⊗X(t+1)/2) 7→ L(A(t+1)/2 ⊗X(t+1)/2).
3. For every input state ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R), for any R,
∆
(
(Ft ⊗ IBt,R)
(
ρ˜t(A˜ , ρin)
)
, ρt (ρin)
)
≤ γ. (1)
A γ-specious adversary B˜ for B is similarly defined.
2.3 Quantum Private Information Retrieval
We define QPIR similarly to [BB15].
Definition 2.5 (Quantum Private Information Retrieval). An s-round, n-bit Quantum Private
Information Retrieval protocol (QPIR) is a two-party protocol ΠQPIR = {A ,B, ρjoint, s}, where A
is the server, B is the client, and ρjoint is an initial state shared between them prior to the protocol.
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We call ΠQPIR (1−δ)-correct if, for all inputs ρin = |x〉〈x|A0⊗|i〉〈i|B0 , with x = x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}n
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a measurement M acting on Bs with outcome 0 or 1, such that:
Pr {M (trAs [A ~B] (ρin)) = xi} ≥ 1− δ .
If δ = 0 we say that the protocol is perfectly correct.
We call ΠQPIR -private against a (possibly adversarial) server A˜ , if there exists a sequence of
quantum operations (simulators) I1, . . . ,Is−1, where It : L(A0 ⊗ Ap) 7→ L(A˜t ⊗ Yt), such that
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ s− 1 and for all ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R),
∆
(
trB0 (It ⊗ IB0,R(ρin)) , trBt(ρ˜2t(A˜ , ρin))
)
≤  . (2)
If  = 0 we say that the protocol is perfectly private.
We say that a QPIR protocol is -private against a class of servers if it is -private against any
server from this class.
We note that in the above definition privacy is required to hold also for adversarial input states
for the client and server, which also includes inputs in superposition, and even for the case where the
client and server (and possibly a third party) are entangled. Nayak [Nay99,ANTSV02] showed that
a perfectly private QPIR protocol, even only against 0-specious servers, must have communication
complexity at least (1 − H(1 − δ))n, where H(p) is the binary entropy function. Baumeler and
Broadbent [BB15] extended this lower bound to the case of  > 0 and presented a communication
lower bound of (
1−H
(
1− δ − 2
√
(2− )
))
n . (3)
3 Anchored Privacy Against Specious Adversaries
We now present our new restricted notion of privacy, that we call anchored privacy. A protocol
is anchored private if it satisfies the standard definition of privacy with respect to classical inputs
on the adversary’s side. There is no privacy requirement for superposition input states on the
adversary’s side (and therefore this notion of privacy is weaker, and hence, easier to achieve). A
formal definition follows.
Definition 3.1 (Anchored Privacy). A QPIR protocol is anchored -private if Eq. (2) holds for all
ρin ∈ A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R (for any R), for which ρin|A0 = |x〉〈x| for some x ∈ {0, 1}n.
We note that prior intuitive notions of security such as that implied by the analysis of Le
Gall [LG12] in fact correspond to anchored privacy against honest servers. Our main theorem
below shows that this type of privacy extends to the specious setting as well.
Theorem 3.2. Let Π be a measurement-free QPIR protocol which is anchored -private against
honest servers, then Π is anchored (+ 3
√
2γ)-private against γ-specious servers.
Critically, the theorem only holds for measurement-free QPIR protocols. To see this, consider
the following protocol, which will be anchored-private against honest servers but not anchored-
private against specious ones. Let Π be a QPIR protocol which is anchored-private against honest
servers (e.g., Le-Gall’s protocol [LG12]). Now consider the following protocol Π′ which first gen-
erates a superposition over all possible databases, then measures this superposition to obtain a
10
classical value for the database. It then runs Π on this measured database (with the client using
its real input index). Finally, both parties toss out the output of this first execution, and run Π
again, now using the actual input database.
Let us first see that Π′ is anchored-private against honest servers. This follows since Π is secure
against honest adversaries when executed over input states in which the server’s input is classical,
and hence so is Π′ which just consists of two sequential executions of Π over classical databases.
However, a purification of an honest server allows to execute a purification attack on the first
execution of Π in a way that allows to recover the client’s input, even though the database used as
input for Π′ is completely classical.
Warm-up. We first give a proof under some simplifying assumptions: (i) γ =  = 0. (ii) the
input is pure (iii) the purification space is trivial: R = C and (iv) the specious server’s quantum
operations A˜t are unitary. The main point that makes the analysis easier in this case is assumption
(i).
Fix a step of the protocol t.
1. We claim that for every unitary γ-specious adversary, which is perfect (i.e. γ = 0) the entire
state, (written in some fixed but maybe non standard basis), is of the form |η〉S′ ⊗ |ψt〉S,C
where |ψt〉 is the state that an honest server and client would have when running on the same
input. Here, and later, we use the notation S for all of the honest server registers at step t,
C for all of the client’s registers at step t and S ′ for the specious server’s ancillary register at
step t. Crucially, |η〉 is independent of the (server and client) input.
We now prove the above claim. By the specious property, we know that there exists a quantum
operation Ft which maps the global state at the tth stage to the state |ψt〉. We know that
the state in step t in the honest run is necessarily pure since Π is measurement free. W.l.o.g.
we can assume that the operation Ft is a unitary Ut, followed by tracing out everything other
then the S and C registers.
Let’s assume towards contradiction that the state in the basis U †t is of the form |η(input)〉 ⊗
|ψt〉, where |η(input)〉 depends on the input (where here we mean both the client and the
server’s input). There must be two different input states such that running them would give
|η(1)〉 ⊗ |ψt(1)〉 and |η(2)〉 ⊗ |ψt(2)〉 for which |η(1)〉 6= |η(2)〉. Since the honest runs are
entirely unitary (by the measurement-free property) and have different inputs, necessarily,
|ψt(1)〉 6= |ψt(2)〉. By running the specious adversary on a superposition of these two inputs,
we get that after applying Ft, the state becomes a mixture of the two states, |ψt(1)〉 and
|ψt(2)〉. This contradicts the perfect specious property (see Eq. (1)) – which requires the state
to be the pure (since all the operations of the client and honest servers are unitary, and their
input in this case is pure).
2. By the perfect anchored-privacy against the honest server, the state ρt = trC(|ψt〉〈ψt|S,C)
is independent of the client’s input, and therefore, could only depend on x – the server’s
input. To emphasize that independence on the client’s input (and possible dependence on the
server’s input), we denote the state ρt by ρt(x).
Our goal is to show the anchored-privacy property for the specious server. Indeed, the two
points above show that the specious server’s state (in the fixed basis we choose to work in) is
|η〉〈η|⊗ρt(x), which is independent of the client’s input. Therefore the simulator can generate that
state exactly by using the server’s classical input x, as required (see Eq. (2)).
11
Outline of the general proof. For each round t we construct a simulator for the server in the
following way: we first construct a simulator I˜ x0,0t for input |x0〉 ⊗ |0〉 where |x0〉 is an input for
the server and |0〉 is an input for the client. We construct this simulator using the simulator for
the honest server along with the ’specious operator’, and an ancillary state |σx0,0〉. We then show
that |σx0,0〉 is also an appropriate ancillary state for any input |x〉 ⊗ |η〉. Using this, we show that
I˜ x,0t is indeed a simulator for any input |x〉 ⊗ |η〉, with slightly worse parameters.
We are now ready to give the proof in full generality:
Theorem 3.2 (Proof). Let Π be a purified QPIR protocol which is anchored -private against honest
servers, and let A˜ be a γ-specious server for Π. W.l.o.g we can assume that A˜ is purified, namely,
a unitary6. From now on, we will fix t. We can denote
|ψρint 〉〈ψρint | = ρt(ρin) (4)
where |ψρint 〉 ∈ S ⊗C ⊗R for some R, and we use S to represent the server’s registers S = At⊗
Yt⊗Ap (for t odd. otherwise S = At⊗Ap), and C to represent the client’s registers C = Bt⊗Xt⊗Bp
(for t even. otherwise C = Bt⊗Bp). Furthermore, w.l.o.g we assume the various recovery operators
for A˜ are purified. That is, there exist unitary operators Fˆt such that Ft(·) = trS′
(
Fˆt(·)
)
for
some purification space S ′ which is at the hands of the server (from now on, for the sake of this
proof, where we say ”recovery operators” we regard these unitary Fˆt operators). Therefore we can
denote
|ψ˜ρint 〉〈ψ˜ρint | = ρ˜t
(
A˜ , ρin
)
(5)
where w.l.o.g |ψ˜ρint 〉 ∈ S′⊗S⊗C ⊗R. We note that all of the unitary operators - At,Bt which are
used in the original protocol (by either the server or the client), A˜t which are used by the specious
server A˜ , and the recovery Fˆt operators are independent of both the client’s and the server’s inputs
For each round t, we will start by constructing a simulator for A˜ acting on ρin = |x0〉〈x0|A0 ⊗
|0〉〈0|B0 , where x0 ∈ {0, 1}n (in this specific input, R is trivial and is thus omitted). By γ-
speciousness of A˜ , along with our purification assumptions, there exists a unitary recovery operator
Fˆ2t : L(A˜t) 7→ L(S ′ ⊗At) such that
∆
(
trS′
((
Fˆ2t ⊗ IC
)
|ψ˜|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉
)
, |ψ|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉
)
≤ γ (6)
By Lemma A.1, this means that there exists a state |σx0,0〉 ∈ S ′ such that:
∆
((
Fˆ2t ⊗ I
)
|ψ˜|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉, |σx0,0〉 ⊗ |ψ|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉
)
≤ √γ (7)
We can now operate on Eq. (7) with Fˆ †2t ⊗ I to get:
∆
(
|ψ˜|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉,
(
Fˆ †2t ⊗ I
)(
|σx0,0〉 ⊗ |ψ|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉
))
≤ √γ (8)
6This is because we can include the purification register at any point, as the server could have included himself
rather than throwing it away
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The above connects the states derived from the execution with the specious server to that with
the honest server. By anchored -privacy of Π against honest servers, there exists a simulator
It : L(A0 ⊗Ap) 7→ L(At ⊗Xt) such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n and |α〉 ∈ B0 ⊗R, for any R,
∆
(
trB0,Bp
((
It ⊗ IB0,Bp
) ◦ (|x〉〈x|A0 ⊗ |α〉〈α|R,B0 ⊗ ρjoint)) , trBt (|ψ|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉)) ≤  (9)
(In fact, the above holds for any mixture over such α’s, by convexity). We can now define the
simulator for ρin corresponding to input state |x0〉⊗|0〉 to be the following unitary embedding from
A0 ⊗Ap to S ′ ⊗A0 ⊗Ap:
I˜ x0,0t (·) = Fˆ †2t ◦ (|σx0,0〉〈σx0,0| ⊗It (·)) (10)
To show that it indeed satisfies the requirements from a simulator, we combine Eqs. (8),(10),
and (9) for x = x0, |α〉 = |0〉, to get that
∆
(
trB0,Bp
((
I˜ x0,0t ⊗ IB0,Bp
)
◦ (|x0〉〈x0|A0 ⊗ |0〉〈0|B0 ⊗ ρjoint)
)
, trBt
(
|ψ˜|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉
))
≤ +√γ (11)
We now define the simulator for any input to be this exact simulator:
I˜t(·) = I˜ x0,0t (·); (12)
In the remainder of the proof we show that I˜t(·) satisfies an inequality similar to Eq. (11) with
respect to all classical server inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n (not necessarily x0) and any input state |α〉 ∈ B0⊗R
for any R, as well as for a mixture of such α’s; this would imply anchored privacy for the specious
server. To this end we show that also for this input, a similar inequality to Eq. (11) holds (with a
slightly worse bound). Define
|xα+〉 = 1√
2
|0〉R′ |x0〉A0 |0〉B0,R +
1√
2
|1〉R′ |x〉A0 |α〉B0,R,
where we have added an additional (control) qubit in the spaceR′. The specious adversary condition
applies to this input state as well, and thus using the same derivation as for Eq. (8)) we get:
∆
(
|ψ˜|xα+〉2t 〉,
(
Fˆ †2t ⊗ I
)(
|σxα+〉 ⊗ |ψ|xα+〉2t 〉
))
≤ √γ (13)
Using the fact that neither the server nor the client act on the R′ register, we get:
|ψ|xα+〉2t 〉 =
1√
2
|0〉R′ ⊗ |ψ|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉S,C,R +
1√
2
|1〉R′ ⊗ |ψ|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉S,C,R (14)
Similarly, since the same is true for the adversarial run, we get:
|ψ˜|xα+〉2t 〉 =
1√
2
|0〉R′ ⊗ |ψ˜|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉S,C,R +
1√
2
|1〉R′ ⊗ |ψ˜|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉S′,S,C,R (15)
We plug Eqs. (14) and (15) into Eq. (13), and project the register R′ in the resulting state onto
|1〉R′ to get:
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∆(
1√
2
|1〉R′ ⊗ |ψ˜|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉S,C ,
(
Fˆ †2t ⊗ IR,C
)( 1√
2
|1〉R′ ⊗ |σx,α+〉S′ ⊗ |ψ|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉S,C
))
≤ √γ (16)
Now we apply the fact that Fˆ †2t doesn’t act on the client’s input; the fact that a unitary operator
doesn’t change the distance between states; and the fact that tracing out doesn’t increase that
distance [AKN98], and Eq. (16) becomes:
∆
(
|ψ˜|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉,
(
Fˆ †2t ⊗ I
)(
|σxα+〉 ⊗ |ψ|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉
))
≤
√
2γ (17)
Similarly, by projecting onto |0〉R′ instead of |1〉R′ in the derivation of 16, we get
∆
(
|ψ˜|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉,
(
Fˆ †2t ⊗ I
)(
|σxα+〉 ⊗ |ψ|x0〉⊗|0〉2t 〉
))
≤
√
2γ (18)
We now want to apply the triangle inequality to (18), using Eqs. (8). Applying yet again the
same sequence of simple argument, namely the fact that unitary transformations preserve the trace
distance and tracing out can only decrease it, we get
∆
(|σx0,0〉, |σxα+〉) ≤ 2√2γ (19)
And we can use Eq. (19) together with Eq. (17) to get:
∆
(
|ψ˜|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉,
(
Fˆ †2t ⊗ I
)(
|σx0,0〉 ⊗ |ψ|x〉⊗|α〉2t 〉
))
≤ 3
√
2γ (20)
And finally combine Eq. (20), (9) and (12) (in a similar way to how we derived Eq. (11)) to get:
∆
(
trB0
((
I˜t ⊗ I
)
(|x〉〈x| ⊗ |α〉〈α| ⊗ ρjoint)
)
, trBt
(
|ψ˜|x〉⊗|α〉t 〉
))
≤ + 3
√
2γ. (21)
This finishes our proof.
4 Linear Lower Bound in the Specious Model, Even with Prior
Entanglement
In this section we show that in the standard specious model, even allowing arbitrarily long prior
entanglement, it is still impossible to achieve QPIR with sublinear communication. We do so by
presenting a new lower bound argument based on an interactive leakage chain rule in [LC18], which
allows us to establish linear lower bounds on both the server’s communication complexity and the
total communication complexity in a unified way. Then we observe that the lower bound on the
server’s communication complexity extends trivially to the case with arbitrary prior entanglement.
In the following, we state some useful preliminaries in Section 4.1 and present our lower bound in
Section 4.2.
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4.1 Quantum Information Theory Background
We first recall the notion of quantum min-entropy. Consider a bipartite quantum state ρAB. The
quantum min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ = − inf
σB
{
inf
{
λ ∈ R : ρAB ≤ 2λIA ⊗ σB
}}
.
When ρAB is a cq-state (i.e., the A register is a classical state), the quantum min-entropy has a
nice operational meaning in terms of guessing probability [KRS09]. Specifically, if Hmin(A|B)ρ = k,
then the optimal probability of predicting the value of A given ρB is exactly 2
−k.
In the following, we state the interactive leakage chain rule in [LC18]. Let ρ = ρAB be a cq-state,
that is, the system A is classical while B is quantum. The interactive leakage chain rule bounds
how much the min-entropy Hmin(A|B)ρ can be decreased by an “interactive leakage” produced by
applying a two-party protocol Π = {A ,B, ρjoint, s} to ρ, where A is treated as a classical input to
A and B is given to B as part of its initial state in ρjoint.
Definition 4.1. Let ρ = ρAB be a cq-state. Let Π = {A ,B, ρjoint, s} be a two-party protocol
where ρjoint contains ρB in the Bp system, and ρin be an input state where the classical state ρA is
copied to A0 as the input for A . (That is, A0 has an initial state |0〉A0 and we do controlled NOT
gates from ρA to |0〉A0 .) Consider the protocol execution [A ~B] (ρin) and let σABs be the final
state where A denotes the original classical state and Bs denotes the final state of B. We say σBs
is an interactive leakage of A produced by Π.
Theorem 4.2. Let ρ = ρAB be a cq-state. Let σABs be the final state of a two-party protocol Π =
{A ,B, ρjoint, s} with certain input state ρin. Let mA and mB be the communication complexity
of A and B, respectively. We have
Hmin(A|Bs)σ ≥ Hmin(A|B)ρ −min{mA +mB, 2mA}, (22)
We will also use the following lemma about gentle measurement, which is first proved by Winter
[Win99] and improved by Ogawa and Nagaoka [ON07], and is also referred to as the almost-as-
good-as-new Lemma by Aaronson [Aar04]. It says that the post-measurement state of an almost-
sure measurement will remain close to its original. The following version is taken from Wilde’s
book [Wil13].
Lemma 4.3. Suppose 0 ≤ Λ ≤ I is a measurement operator such that for a mixed state ρ,
tr (Λρ) ≥ 1− .
Then the post-measurement state ρ˜ is
√
-close to the original state ρ:
||ρ˜− ρ||tr ≤
√
.
We will also need the following lemma, which can be proved by a standard argument us-
ing Uhlmann theorem and the Fuchs and van de Graaf inequality [FvdG99] (for a proof, see,
e.g., [BB15]).
Lemma 4.4. Suppose ρA, σA ∈ A are two quantum states with purifications |φ〉AB, |ψ〉AB ∈ A⊗B,
respectively, and ||ρA − σA||tr ≤ . Then there exists a unitary UB ∈ L(B) such that
|||φ〉AB − IA ⊗ UB|ψ〉AB||tr ≤
√
(2− ).
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4.2 Our Lower Bound
Theorem 4.5. Let Π = {A ,B, ρjoint = |0〉〈0|, s} be a QPIR protocol for the server’s database of
size n. Suppose Π is (1− δ)-correct and -private against γ-specious servers with δ ≤ n−4/100,  ≤
n−8/100. Then the server’s communication complexity is at least (n− 1)/2 and the total commu-
nication complexity is at least n− 1.
In the above theorem, we consider protocols with no prior setup, i.e., ρjoint = |0〉〈0|. We observe
that the lower bound for the server’s communication complexity extends for general ρjoint, since
one can think of ρjoint as prepared by the client, who sends the server’s initial state to the server at
the beginning of the protocol. This simple reduction does not increase the server’s communication
complexity and extends the lower bound on the server’s communication complexity for arbitrary
ρjoint.
Corollary 4.6. Let Π = {A ,B, ρjoint, s} be a QPIR protocol for the server’s database of size n
with arbitrary ρjoint. Suppose Π is (1 − δ)-correct and -private against γ-specious servers with
δ ≤ n−4/100,  ≤ n−8/100. Then the server’s communication complexity is at least (n− 1)/2.
We now prove Theorem 4.5.
Proof. To establish communication complexity lower bound for Π, we consider a purified version
Π¯ = {A¯ , B¯, ρjoint, s} of Π, where both parties’ operations are purified. Specifically, A¯ is modified
from A , where the sequence of quantum operations A¯1, . . . , A¯s are unitaries
A¯1 :L(A0 ⊗ A¯0)→ L(A1 ⊗ A¯1 ⊗X1),
A¯t :L(At−1 ⊗ A¯t−1 ⊗ Yt−1)→ L(At ⊗ A¯t ⊗Xt), t = 2, . . . , s;
A¯0 is of sufficiently large dimension and initialized to |0〉; A¯t are called purifying spaces and
trA¯t(ρ¯t(ρin)) = ρt(ρin)
for all ρ ∈ A0 ⊗ B0. The purified B¯ for B is similarly defined.
By inspection, it is easy to verify that Π¯ preserves the properties of Π, i.e., Π¯ is also (1 − δ)-
correct, -private against γ-specious servers, and has the same communication complexity as Π.
Thus, communication complexity lower bound for Π¯ implies that for Π. Also, note that A¯ is a
0-specious adversary for Π.
Now, let us consider an experiment that first samples a uniformly random database a ∈ {0, 1}n,
and use a as the server’s database to run the protocol Π¯ with an arbitrary fixed input of the client.
Note that execution of the protocol can be viewed as producing an interactive leakage of a. Let
ρAB denote the final state where system A denotes the input a and system B has the client’s final
local state. By Theorem 4.2, we have
H(A|B)ρ ≥ H(A)ρ −min{2mA,mA +mB},
where mA,mB denote the server and the client’s communication complexities, respectively. The
operational meaning of min-entropy says that given the client’s state ρB, one cannot guess the
random database a correctly with probability higher than 2−(H(A)ρ−min{2mA,mA+mB}). To derive a
lower bound on the communication complexity, we show a strategy to predict the database a with
probability at least 1− n2
√
δ + 2
√
(1− ) > 1/2, which gives the desired lower bound.
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Let σiB = trA[A¯ ~ B¯](|a〉〈a|A0 ⊗ |i〉〈i|B0) and σiA = trB[A¯ ~ B¯](|a〉〈a|A0 ⊗ |i〉〈i|B0).
By the definition of privacy, there exists a quantum operation F such that
∆
(
trB0F0 ⊗ IB¯0
(
ρ1in
)
, σ1A
) ≤ . (23)
Since trB0F0 ⊗ IB¯0
(
ρ1in
)
= trB0F0 ⊗ IB¯0
(
ρiin
)
for all i,
∆
(
trB0F0 ⊗ IB¯0
(
ρ1in
)− σiA) ≤  (24)
We have, by triangle inequality,
∆
(
σ1A − σiA
) ≤ 2.
for all i.
By Lemma 4.4, we have
∆
(
IA ⊗ U1→iB |ψ1〉A¯B¯, |ψi〉A¯B¯
) ≤ 2√(1− ) , ′, (25)
where |φ〉A¯B¯ and |ψi〉A¯B¯ are purifications of σ1A and σiA, respectively.
By the definition of correctness error, there exists measurement Mi such that
Pr
{Mi (σiB) = ai} ≥ 1− δ.
Let
M′i =
(
U1→iB
)†MiU1→iB
for i = 2, . . . , n. Thus we have by Eq. (25)
Pr
{M′i (σ1B) = ai} ≥ 1− δ − ′. (26)
By Lemma 4.3, the client can recover σ˜
(i)
B such that
∆
(
σ˜
(i)
B , σ
1
B
)
≤ √δ + ′. (27)
Now we construct a protocol for the client to learn all the bits a = a1, . . . , an. First the client
chooses input |1〉〈1|. Then he plays the protocol Π¯ with Alice and obtains σ1B. Measuring σ1B by
M1, the client gets a1 with probability at least 1 − δ. By Lemma 4.3, the client can recover σ˜1B
such that
∆
(
σ˜1B, σ
1
B
) ≤ √δ.
Then the client measures M′2 on σ˜1B and then recovers σ˜2B. Continue this process and σ˜kB will be
the state recovered from applying M′k to σ˜k−1B . We claim that
∆
(
σ˜kB, σ
1
B
)
≤ k√δ + ′. (28)
Suppose this is true for i = 2, · · · , k. If we measure M′k+1 on σ˜k+1B and on σ1B, respectively, and
recover σ˜k+1B and σ˜
(k+1)
B , respectively, we have
∆
(
σ˜k+1B , σ˜
(k+1)
B
)
≤ ∆
(
σ˜kB, σ
1
B
)
≤ k√δ + ′ (29)
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where the first inequality is because quantum operations do not increase trace distance. Now use
the triangle inequality with Eqs. (27) and (29), and the claim follows by induction.
By Eqs. (26) and (28), the probability of recovering ai by measuring M′i on σ˜i−1B is at least
1− i√δ + ′. Therefore, the client learns a with probability at least
n∏
i=1
(
1− i√δ + ′
)
≥ 1− n2√δ + ′,
which is what we need to complete the proof.
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A Hilbert Spaces and Quantum States
The Hilbert space of a quantum system A is denoted by the corresponding calligraphic letter A and
its dimension is denoted by dim(A). Let L(A) be the space of linear operators on A. A quantum
state of system A is described by a density operator ρA ∈ L(A) that is positive semidefinite and
with unit trace (tr(ρA) = 1). Let S(A) = {ρA ∈ L(A) : ρA ≥ 0, tr(ρA) = 1} be the set of density
operators on A. When ρA ∈ S(A) is of rank one, it is called a pure quantum state and we can
write ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|A for some unit vector |ψ〉A ∈ A, where 〈ψ| = |ψ〉† is the conjugate transpose of
|ψ〉. If ρA is not pure, it is called a mixed state and can be expressed as a convex combination of
pure quantum states.
The Hilbert space of a joint quantum system AB is the tensor product of the corresponding
Hilbert spaces A ⊗ B. For ρAB ∈ S(A ⊗ B), its reduced density operator in system A is ρA =
trB(ρAB), where
trB(ρAB) =
∑
i
IA ⊗ 〈i|B (ρAB) IA ⊗ |i〉B
for an orthonormal basis {|i〉B} for B. We sometimes use the equivalent notation,
ρAB|A := trB(ρAB).
Suppose ρA ∈ S(A) of finite dimension dim(A). Then there exists B of dimension dim(B) ≥
dim(A) and |ψ〉AB ∈ A⊗ B such that
trB|ψ〉〈ψ|AB = ρA.
The state |ψ〉AB is called a purification of ρA.
The trace distance between two quantum states ρ and σ is
∆(ρ, σ) = ||ρ− σ||tr,
where ||X||tr = 12tr
√
X†X is the trace norm of X. Hence the trace distance between two pure
states |α〉, |β〉 is
∆(|α〉〈α|, |β〉〈β|) =
√
1− |〈α|β〉|2 . (30)
Lemma A.1. Consider a quantum state ρXY over two registers X,Y , and denote ρX = trY (ρXY ).
Then if there exists , |ϕ〉 s.t. ∆(ρX , |ϕ〉〈ϕ|) ≤ , then there exists ρ˜Y s.t. ∆(ρXY , |ϕ〉〈ϕ|⊗ ρ˜Y ) ≤
√
.
Furthermore, if ρXY is pure then so is ρ˜Y .
Proof. It is sufficient w.l.o.g to prove for a pure ρXY , since it is always possible to purify ρXY by
adding an additional register Z, and consider the pure state ρXY Z . The transitivity of the partial
trace operation implies that if the theorem is true for X, (Y Z), then it is also true for X,Y . Also
assume w.l.o.g that |ϕ〉 = |0〉 (this is just a matter of choosing a basis elements).
Thus we will provide a proof in the case where the joint state of X,Y can be written as a
superposition |α〉 = ∑x,y wx,y|x〉|y〉. Define P0 = Pr[X = 0] = ∑y |w0,y|2, and note that it must
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be the case that P0 ≥ 1 − . To see this, note that P0 is the probability of measuring X = 0 in
the experiment where we first trace out Y and then measuring X. Since ∆(ρX , |0〉〈0|) ≤ , the
probability of measuring X = 0 after tracing out Y is  close to the probability of measuring X = 0
in |0〉〈0|, which is 1 (see, e.g., [AKN98]). The claim P0 ≥ 1−  follows.
Now define |β〉 = 1√
P0
∑
y w0,y|y〉, and let ρ˜Y = |β〉〈β|. Then
∆(ρXY , |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ˜Y ) = ∆(|α〉〈α|, |0〉〈0| ⊗ |β〉〈β|) =
√
1− |〈α|(0, β)〉|2 . (31)
We have
〈α|(0, β)〉 = 1√
P0
∑
y
|w0,y|2 =
√
P0 , (32)
which implies that indeed ∆(ρXY , |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ˜Y ) =
√
1− P0 ≤
√
.
B Security Analysis of Kereneidis et al.’s Protocol
For completeness, we restate7 the QPIR protocol with pre-shared entanglement by Kerenidis et
al. [KLGR16, Section 6]. Given a database DB ∈ {0, 1}n for some n = 2` as input to the server, and
index i ∈ [n] as input to the client (If the client’s input is a superposition, the algorithm is run in
superposition), we denote the protocol Πn as follows.
The protocol Πn is recursive and calls Πn/2 as a subroutine. For the execution of Πn, the parties
are required to pre-share a pair of entangled state registers 1
2n/4
∑
r∈{0,1}n/2 |r〉R|r〉R′ , where R is
held by the server and R′ is held by the client. They also share an entangled state needed for
the recursive application of the protocol Πn/2 (and the recursive calls it entails). Unfolding the
recursion, this means that for all n′ = 2`′ with `′ ∈ [`− 1], there is an entangled register of length
n′ shared between the client and the server.
The protocol execution is described in shorthand Figure 1. In what follows we provide a detailed
description and analyze the steps of the protocol to establish correctness and assert properties that
will allow us to analyze privacy.
1. If n = 1 then the database contains a single value. In this case there is no need for shared
entanglement, and the server sends a register F containing |DB〉 (the final response) to the
client, and the protocol terminates. This is trivially secure and efficient. Otherwise proceed
to the next steps.
2. The server denotes DB0, DB1 ∈ {0, 1}n/2 s.t. DB = [DB0‖DB1], i.e. the low-order and high-
order bits of the database respectively. The server starts with two single-bit registers Q0, Q1
initialized to 0. The server CNOTs Qb with the inner product of R and DBb so that it contains
|r · DBb〉Qb , and sends Q0, Q1 to the client.
At this point, the joint state between the client and (an honest) server is∑
r∈{0,1}n/2
|r〉R|r〉R′ |r · DB0〉Q0 |r · DB1〉Q1 .
In particular the reduced density matrix of the server’s state is independent of the index i.
7We make one minor adaptation – see Remark 1.
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3. Let b∗ = b i−1n e denote the most significant bit of i. The client evaluates a Z gate on Qb∗ . It
sends Q0, Q1 back to the server.
At this point, the joint state between the client and (an honest) server is∑
r∈{0,1}n/2
(−1)r·DBb∗ |r〉R|r〉R′ |r · DB0〉Q0 |r · DB1〉Q1 .
Importantly, the reduced density matrix of the server, which contains the registers R,Q0, Q1,
is the diagonal matrix that corresponds to the classical distribution of sampling a random r
in register R, and placing r · DB0, r · DB1 in Q0, Q1. This density matrix is independent of b∗
and therefore of i.
4. The server again CNOTs Qb with the inner product of R and DBb.
At this point, the joint state between the client and (an honest) server is∑
r∈{0,1}n/2
(−1)r·DBb∗ |r〉R|r〉R′ |0〉Q0 |0〉Q1 .
From this point on we disregard Q0, Q1 since they remain zero throughout. Since this step
only involves a local unitary by the server, we are guaranteed that its reduced density matrix
is still independent of i.
5. The server performs QFT on R and the client performs QFT on R′. The resulting state is
1
23n/4
∑
r,y,w∈{0,1}n/2
(−1)r·(DBb∗⊕y⊕w)|y〉R|w〉R′ = 12n/4
∑
y∈{0,1}n/2
|y〉R|y ⊕ DBb∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
〉R′ .
Since we only performed local operations on the server and client side (without communica-
tion), the server’s density matrix remains perfectly independent of b∗ and thus of i.
6. Note that at this point, the joint state of the client and server is a “shifted” entangled state
where the shift corresponds to the half-database DBb∗ that contains the element that the client
wishes to retrieve. More explicitly, DB[i] = DBb∗ [i
∗] for i∗ = i (mod n/2) contains the (`− 1)
least significant bits of i. Therefore, for all y,w in the support of the joint state, it holds that
DB[i] = w[i∗]⊕ y[i∗].
The client will now ignore (temporarily) the register R′ and execute Πn/2 recursively on index
i∗. The (honest) server will carry out the protocol with the value y from the register R serving
as the server’s database. Note that since the register R′ is not touched, for the purposes of
executing the protocol the value w in R′ is equivalent to have been measured, and the value
y in R is equivalent to the deterministic register w ⊕ DBb∗ .
We are recursively guaranteed that in the end of the execution of Πn/2, the client receives
a register F containing the value y[i∗] = w[i∗] ⊕ DBb∗ [i∗] = w[i∗] ⊕ DB[i]. Since the client
still maintains the original register R′ containing w, it can CNOT the value w[i∗] from F
and obtain |DB[i]〉A. Namely, in the end of the execution, the register F indeed contains the
desired value DB[i].
23
7. Lastly, if the client and server desire to “clean up” and restore the shared entanglement so
that it can be reused in consequent executions, the client can copy the contents of the register
F to a fresh register (which is possible since this register contains a classical value). Since
the client and server are pure (i.e. do not measure) throughout the protocol, they can rewind
the execution of the protocol to restore their initial joint entanglement.
If the final cleanup step is not executed then the total number of rounds of Πn is 2` + 1, and the
total communication complexity is 4l + 1 (recall that ` = log(n)). If the cleanup step is executed,
the round complexity and communication complexity are doubled due to rewinding the execution.
Remark 1. Note that in the original protocol by Kerenidis et al. step 7 does not appear, and it
is not mentioned that the shared entanglement can be cleaned and reused.
We conclude that for classical inputs for both the client and the server, the honest server’s
density matrix is independent of i. If the client first measures its input state, privacy holds. But
since the very first operation is a CNOT operation (to determine the value of i) and since CNOT
and measurements in the standard basis commute, we conclude that the server’s reduced density
matrix is independent of the client’s input, even for inputs which are in superposition.
Lemma B.1. The protocol Πn is a PIR protocol with perfect correctness and perfect anchored
privacy against honest servers. It furthermore has communication complexity O(log n), and uses
O(n) bits of (reusable) shared entanglement.
Proof. The analysis in the body of the protocol establishes that the local view of the adversary is
independent of i, when i is treated as a fixed parameter. For the sake of our privacy notion, we are
required to establish that the server’s local state is independent of i even when i is an arbitrary
quantum state. This follows since the client refers to the index i as constant, and therefore a
superposition over i will translate to a superposition over classical executions of the protocol, each
with a fixed i. Since the server’s local view is identical for any fixed i, it will also be in the same
state for a superposition, and also for an arbitrary mixed state of i and some potential environment.
The communication complexity and the amount of reusable shared entanglement needed in this
protocol follow directly from the protocol.
We can therefore apply Theorem 3.2 and conclude that Π is secure against anchored-specious
adversaries.
Corollary B.2. There exists a PIR protocol Π with logarithmic communication complexity as-
suming linear shared entanglement, which is perfectly correct and anchored O(
√
γ)-private against
γ-specious adversaries.
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Recursive QPIR with Logarithmic Communication
Server input: Database DB ∈ {0, 1}n.
Client input: Index i ∈ [n].
Desired output: Value DB[i] stored in register F on the client side.
Setup: Register R for server and R′ for client in joint state 1
2n/4
∑
r∈{0,1}n/2 |r〉R|r〉R′ .
(This setup is for external recursion loop, internal loops require their own R,R′ defined recursively.)
1. If n = 1, copy the (single-bit) database into a register and send to client, then terminate (or go to
clean up step 7 below).
2. The server denotes DB0, DB1 ∈ {0, 1}n/2 s.t. DB = [DB0‖DB1], i.e. the low-order and high-order bits of
the database respectively. The server starts with two single-bit registers Q0, Q1 initialized to 0. The
server CNOTs Qb with the inner product of R and DBb so that it contains |r · DBb〉Qb . It sends Q0, Q1
to the client.
3. Let b∗ = b i−1n e denote the most significant bit of i. The client evaluates a Z gate on Qb∗ . It sends
Q0, Q1 back to the server.
4. The server again CNOTs Qb with the inner product of R and DBb.
5. The server performs QFT on R and the client performs QFT on R′.
6. Call Πn/2 recursively (with fresh R,R
′ obtained from the setup). The server input is the contents
of the register R (of length n/2). The client input is i∗ = i (mod n/2) ∈ [n/2]. The client receives
a response register F as the output of the recursive call. It then CNOTs R′[i∗] into F . Finally, F
contains the output of the recursive execution.
7. If it is desired to restore the shared entanglement, copy the (classical) output into a fresh register and
rewind the execution of the protocol.
Figure 1: The QPIR protocol of Kerenidis et al.
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